Inspectors
AI Guard
An optional model layer for semantic cases regex cannot see — intent, indirect instructions, fragmented leaks. It always runs after the deterministic checks.
Two layers
| Layer | Phase | What it inspects | Setting |
|---|---|---|---|
| Layer 1 | Request | Outbound arguments and action intent; semantic exfiltration | inspect_request |
| Layer 2 | Response | Indirect prompt injection in returned results | inspect_response |
Providers
provider | Use |
|---|---|
typesafe | TypeSafe AI Jev. The default. Typed JSON output, ~50–100 ms. |
ollama | Local / on-premise model. |
openai | OpenAI-compatible endpoints: vLLM, LM Studio, Azure, OpenAI. |
anthropic | Anthropic API. |
custom | Your own HTTP endpoint. |
Configuration
guard_model:
enabled: true
provider: "typesafe"
endpoint: "https://api.typesafe.ai/v1/classify"
model: "jev-security-v1"
timeout_ms: 1000 # fail-closed on timeout
min_content_length: 10 # skip very short content
inspect_request: true
inspect_response: true
thresholds:
confidence: 0.6
Structured output
TypeSafe AI Jev returns a typed decision instead of free text, so there are no parse errors:
{
"allow": false,
"threatCategory": "data_leak", // jailbreak | injection | data_leak | abuse | none
"confidence": 0.93,
"reason": "Outbound email body contains customer table export"
}
Failure behaviour
If the model errors or timeout_ms is exceeded the call is handled fail-closed. When the model is disabled or unconfigured, AvertGate runs with the Tier-1 deterministic checks only, at zero cost.
DataWhich fields go to the guard provider, and where it runs, depends on configuration. If data must not leave your network, use a local Ollama/vLLM.